Both of Brazil's runoff candidates promise to process rare earths for the data center age. Neither program puts a number on it.

Yesterday this desk wrote that Brasília is talking about a Lynas separation plant in Poços de Caldas that the company’s own budget does not yet contain (Brasília says Lynas will build one of the biggest rare earth separation plants outside China). The same gap now runs through the presidential race. Both candidates in the 25 October runoff say Brazil will stop shipping raw ore and start processing it, and both connect that promise to AI and data centers. Neither program says how much separation capacity, by when, or with whose money.

What’s happening

• A close first round. With 99.79 percent of ballot boxes counted on 4 October, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) had 47.08 percent of valid votes and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) had 45.10 percent, setting up a runoff on 25 October [Viva/Broadcast, 4 October 2026]. Desk arithmetic: a gap of about 2.0 points, or 2,348,517 votes.
• Lula’s program. The 84-page plan filed with the TSE lists artificial intelligence, digitalization, critical minerals and rare earths among its priorities and aims to “criar cadeias nacionais de processamento e agregar valor antes da exportação” [Gazeta do Povo, 17 August 2026]. Data centers would face local content requirements and would have to offer computing capacity to the Brazilian market [Congresso em Foco, 14 August 2026]. The plan “não define metas de produção nem o volume de financiamento” for the minerals policy [Forbes Brasil, 6 October 2026].
• Flávio’s program. His 76-page plan names rare earths alongside lithium, niobium, graphite, copper, nickel and uranium, and calls for faster licensing, foreign capital and value added in Brazil [Folha BV, 27 August 2026]. It wants Brazil to be a “polo global de data centers sustentáveis, aproveitando a matriz elétrica renovável” [Teletime, 17 August 2026], with processing of lithium, niobium, copper and rare earths integrated with clean energy supply for data centers and fixed deadlines for environmental licensing [Exame, 12 October 2026]. In the plan text, the minerals and data center passages carry no production, investment or capacity figure. On licensing it promises “prazos definidos”, says a licence should be granted if the agency does not decide in time, and offers rule stability of up to 20 years for long projects [Plano de governo de Flávio Bolsonaro, via Voto Secreto, accessed 13 October 2026].
• The memo with the numbers. A 22-page presentation dated 19 March 2026, written by André Marinho and bearing the cover line “Flávio Bolsonaro | 2026 Campaign”, projects US$50 billion to US$100 billion over ten years in mining, refining and processing, and 500,000 to 1 million jobs. Marinho told Amado Mundo it was a personal initiative and that the campaign neither requested nor guided it; the campaign did not answer questions about it [Amado Mundo via Diário do RN, 12 September 2026].
• Rare earths as a runoff theme. On the night of the first round, Lula called rare earths and critical minerals a technology project for the country: “Vamos convencer o povo brasileiro da importância de continuarmos com um projeto de desenvolvimento de terras raras e minerais críticos” [ND Mais, João Alfredo Nyegray, 12 October 2026].

Why this sits in the AI lane

The IEA notes that data centers use relevant quantities of copper, aluminium, silicon, gallium and rare earths, and projects data center electricity use could more than double by 2030 to about 945 terawatt-hours [Gazeta Mercantil, citing the IEA, 11 September 2026]. Brazil is building into that demand: 106 MW of data center capacity was delivered in the first half of 2026, another 134 MW is expected by December, and 660 MW is under construction [JLL, 14 August 2026]. Both candidates now present minerals and data centers as one industrial story. Lula put the logic plainly at a rally in Rio, promising data centers running in Brazil “porque gasta muita energia e nós temos energia aqui no Brasil” [Brasil 247, 22 August 2026].

Brazil angle

Whoever wins does not start from zero. Lula signed the critical minerals policy on 16 September, with a guarantee fund that can receive up to R$2 billion from the federal government and tax credits of up to R$5 billion between 2030 and 2034 for companies that beneficiate, transform or recycle minerals in Brazil [Metrópoles, 16 September 2026]. Law 15.506 also created the national council for the industrialization of critical minerals, the CIMCE [Vermelho, 2 October 2026]. A day earlier the government sanctioned Redata, which suspends taxes on ICT equipment for data centers for five years on condition that operators direct at least 10 percent of their capacity to the domestic market, run on clean or renewable power and invest in research in Brazil [Ministério da Fazenda, 16 September 2026].

Desk arithmetic: the fund and the credits add up to R$7 billion, about US$1.35 billion at R$5.2 per dollar. The low end of the Marinho memo, US$50 billion, is about 37 times that. Neither candidate’s program bridges that distance with a figure.

US angle

Washington’s money in Brazilian rare earths has gone to a mine so far. Serra Verde’s Pela Ema operation in Goiás received US$565 million in financing from the US International Development Finance Corporation, and USA Rare Earth agreed in April to buy Serra Verde for about US$2.8 billion. Serra Verde holds a 15-year offtake with a vehicle for producing NdFeB magnets that is funded by US government and private sources, with price floors for neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium [Mining Technology, 21 April 2026]. On 12 October USA Rare Earth traded at US$11.86, down 6 percent, and was down 30 percent over the month, with its Department of Commerce support paid only as milestones are reached [24/7 Wall St., 12 October 2026]. Flávio’s plan courts foreign capital and leaves the US partnership to the Marinho memo. Lula keeps the door open too: “Eu não tenho cerceamento aos Estados Unidos,” he told Flow Podcast [Vermelho, 2 October 2026].

China angle

China processes about 99 percent of the world’s heavy rare earth supply, and its April 2025 licensing on seven medium and heavy rare earths, including dysprosium and terbium, has never been paused. The broader October 2025 package was suspended under the Busan truce until 10 November 2026, and Tech Times reported no extension as of 2 October [Tech Times, 2 October 2026]. Other outlets have since reported a short extension into January 2027; this desk could not confirm it from an official text, so 10 November, 16 days after the runoff, remains the date on the record. CSIS puts Brazil’s rare earth reserves at 21 million tonnes, behind China’s 44 million, with 13 active projects against 89 in Australia [CSIS, 27 April 2026]. Lula’s line is that “a China pode ser parceira nossa, trazendo tecnologia para nós, como os Estados Unidos também” [Vermelho, 2 October 2026]. The Marinho memo, which its author says the campaign did not commission, describes Brazil as one of the main suppliers and processing centers of minerals aligned with the West [Amado Mundo via Diário do RN, 12 September 2026]. The separation know-how both plans need sits overwhelmingly in China either way.

What it means

The runoff is not a choice between processing and exporting ore. Both camps have already chosen processing on paper. It is a choice of financing model and partner: state coordination through the guarantee fund, tax credits and the CIMCE, with Chinese and American technology both invited, against foreign private capital and faster licensing, with a US partnership floated in an allied memo. What neither program does is commit to the step that decides whether Brazil’s rare earths reach a data center as a magnet or as a carbonate: a separation plant of stated size, with a date and a funder. Until one does, the Lynas plant discussed in this desk’s previous piece is the closest thing Brazil has to a named project, and it is not yet in the company’s budget.

What to watch

1. 25 October runoff. Whether the winner’s first statements name a separation target or a financing figure, rather than repeating the program language.
2. 10 November. Whether Beijing formally confirms an extension of the suspension of its October 2025 controls. A lapse would land 16 days after the vote and raise the stakes for every non-Chinese separation plan.
3. CIMCE and Redata in practice. Redata leaves its sustainability criteria to regulation [Ministério da Fazenda, 16 September 2026]. Watch for those rules and for the CIMCE’s first ruling on a change of control in a critical minerals company: the first concrete test of either candidate’s processing promise.