Brazil’s Congress is moving fast to create a national policy for critical and strategic minerals, and the scale of what is at stake is becoming clear. An analysis by InfoAmazonia of Agência Nacional de Mineração (ANM) data through July 11, 2026, identifies 4,795 active mining processes for high-technology minerals across the Legal Amazon, covering 23 million hectares. Two-thirds of those processes were opened after 2016. The legislative framework to accelerate them is now in active negotiation.

What’s happening

The 23 million hectares under process is not a typo. It is more than 150 times the area of the city of São Paulo. The minerals being targeted are directly relevant to the AI buildout: copper (67.5% of processes), tin (11.6%), nickel (5.9%), tantalum (4%), and rare earths (2.6%). The geographic concentration is heavy: Pará holds 47% of the processes, Mato Grosso 19%, and Rondônia 8.4%.

Here is the critical detail: almost 80% of these processes (3,805 covering 17.7 million hectares) are still in the research phase. Only 60 are actual mining concessions. Another 150 are in the requerimento (application) phase, and 779 are held by the federal government and available for concession. The pipeline is enormous. The production is not.

The ANM defines critical and strategic minerals as those essential for economic development with applications in high technology, defense, and the energy transition. A 2021 Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) resolution divides 22 strategic minerals into three categories: import-dependent inputs like phosphate and potash; high-technology minerals including copper, tin, nickel, tantalum, and rare earths; and minerals where Brazil holds competitive advantage, such as iron ore and bauxite.

Brazil angle

The legislative push is what turns this from a geological inventory into a live policy story. Two bills are moving in Congress, and their convergence is accelerating.

PL 2780/2024, authored by deputy Zé Silva (União-MG), was approved by the Câmara dos Deputados on May 6, 2026, and sent to the Senate. It proposes a National Plan for Critical and Strategic Minerals, a National Council for Industrialization, a registry for strategic projects, a supply-chain traceability system, and a guarantee fund, among other instruments. Senator Beto Faro (PT-PA) filed an urgency request on July 2, which is still pending plenary review.

PL 4443/2025, authored by senator Renan Calheiros (MDB-AL), has been in the Senate since September 2025. It was approved by the Comissão de Assuntos Econômicos on December 9, 2025, and moved to the Comissão de Serviços de Infraestrutura. On July 14, 2026, relator Wilder Morais (PL-GO) presented a substitutivo that merged the governance, financing, research, and innovation structures from PL 2780 into PL 4443. The merged text now moves as a single bill with terminative character in the Infrastructure Committee, meaning if approved there it goes directly to the Câmara without further Senate committee review.

The bills establish Zonas de Processamento e Transformação Mineral (ZPTM), areas with intensive mineral activity where processing and industrial transformation would be prioritized and facilitated. Projects in ZPTMs would be subject to the Licenca Ambental Especial (LAE), created under the Lei Geral de Licenciamento Ambiental approved in August 2025 and effective since February 4, 2026. The LAE gives licensing authorities 12 months to decide on strategic projects, a significant acceleration from prior timelines.

The environmental and Indigenous rights implications are the flashpoint. InfoAmazonia’s analysis found 386 mining processes for high-tech minerals overlapping or bordering 69 Indigenous lands, covering 1.52 million hectares. The most affected territories are Araca-Padauiri (76 processes) in Amazonas; Xikrin do Rio Cateté (27), Sawré Muybu (21), and Badjonkore (18) in Pará; and Yanomami (19) in Roraima and Amazonas. An additional 1,076 processes overlap or sit inside conservation units, covering 5 million hectares.

The Jamanxim case is the most concrete example. The Floresta Nacional do Jamanxim in Pará holds 124 copper research requests across 770,000 of its 1.3 million hectares, nearly all from Anglo American. On July 15, 2026, the Senate approved PL 2.486/2026, which reduces the Flona by 486,000 hectares and reclassifies that area as an Área de Proteção Ambiental (APA), a less restrictive land-use category. The bill now awaits presidential sanction.

US angle

For US investors and offtake partners, the legislative timeline matters because it defines when Brazilian copper supply could materially enter global markets. The research-to-production gap is the binding constraint: 3,805 research-phase processes versus 60 actual concessions. The bills are designed to compress that gap through ZPTMs, fast-track licensing, and credit incentives.

The risk is on the other side of the ledger. The MAE’s 12-month timeline does not include free, prior, and informed consultation with Indigenous communities, as required under ILO Convention 169. Environmental groups and Indigenous organizations have flagged this as a litigation risk that could freeze projects even after licensing. The National Council for Industrialization proposed in the bills includes up to 15 representatives from federal agencies, states, municipalities, the private sector, and universities, but no civil society seats, a structure critics call undemocratic.

If the framework passes and survives judicial review, Brazil becomes a more predictable destination for copper development capital. If it triggers a wave of injunctions, the 23-million-hectare pipeline stays theoretical.

China angle

China is the implicit comparator in this story, not a direct actor. China controls roughly 60% of global copper processing capacity. Brazil exports concentrate, not cathode. The ZPTM logic is about downstream capture, but Brazil has limited smelting or refining infrastructure in the Amazon region. Without that, the value-add stays in China regardless of where the ore is mined.

The strategic question for Beijing is whether a Brazilian copper acceleration changes the global concentrate market enough to affect Chinese offtake pricing. With 80% of the Amazon pipeline still in research, that is a 2028-2030 question, not a 2026 one. But the legislative signal is clear: Brazil intends to compete for the capital that wants non-Chinese supply.

What it means

The AI buildout pulls copper demand through data center power distribution, grid interconnection, and EV infrastructure. The International Energy Agency and Copper Development Association have both flagged copper as a supply-constrained input for the energy transition and digital infrastructure. Brazil’s Amazon holds a large exploration pipeline, but exploration is not production.

The legislative framework moving through Congress is designed to change that ratio. Whether it succeeds depends on three variables: the final text of the merged bill, the judicial response to LAE applications in sensitive areas, and the infrastructure investment (power, rail, port) needed to move concentrate from the Amazon to global markets. The bills address licensing. They do not address logistics.

What to watch

Sources: InfoAmazonia analysis of ANM data (July 11, 2026); Senado Notícias (July 15, 2026); Câmara dos Deputados PL 2780/2024; Lei Geral de Licenciamento Ambiental (August 2025).